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The stand-alone-cost test has become an expensive, extensive, and time-consuming part 
of the regulatory practice of the U.S. Surface Transportation Board in the performance of 
its statutory duty to protect "captive shippers" from monopoly rail rates.  Worse, a close 
examination of the history of its adoption and application suggests only a very tenuous 
connection with its claimed intellectual foundations, the classic works of Faulhaber 
(1975) and Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982).  It is time to retire this tool and replace it 
with something simpler and more effective and transparent. Against the Stand-Alone-Cost Test in U.S. Freight Rail Regulation 
 
Rate regulation for the majority of freight movements on U.S. railroads was eliminated 
by the Staggers Act (49 U.S.C., Public Law 94-473) in 1980.  However, one category of 
traffic remains subject to potential regulation:  that carried by so-called “captive 
shippers,” those shippers with no economic alternative to the use of a single railroad.
1  A 
recent decision by the rail regulator, the Surface Transportation Board (STB), interprets 
the statutory principle as follows: 
 
Where a railroad has market dominance, its transportation rates must be 
reasonable.  Market dominance is defined as an absence of effective competition 
from other rail carriers or modes of transportation for the transportation to which 
a rate applies.  The Board is precluded from finding market dominance if the 
revenues produced by a challenged rate are less than 180% of the carrier’s 
variable costs of providing the service.
2 
 
In 1985 the predecessor agency to the STB, the Interstate Commerce Commission, issued 
its  Coal Rate Guidelines, Nationwide, which set out the standards by which the 
Commission (and later the STB) would evaluate the “reasonableness” of rates charged to 
captive shippers.
3  These standards went under the label “constrained market pricing” 
(CMP) – a label that could alternatively be phrased “constrained differential pricing”. 
 
The objectives of CMP can be simply stated.  A captive shipper should not be 
required to pay more than is necessary for the carrier involved to earn adequate 
revenues.  Nor should it pay more than is necessary for efficient service.  And a 




In formulating CMP, the ICC acknowledged  the welfare advantages of differential or 
Ramsey pricing – prices set inversely to the demand elasticities of customers – in the 
presence of economies of scale sufficient to render marginal cost pricing impractical.  
However, the freedom of the railroads to set differential prices would not be unlimited.  
In particular: 
 
CMP contains three main constraints on the extent to which a railroad may charge 
differentially higher rates on captive traffic.  The revenue adequacy constraint 
ensures that a captive shipper “will not be required to continue to pay 
differentially higher rates than other shippers when some or all of that differential 
is no longer necessary to ensure a financially sound carrier capable of meeting its  
                                                 
1 In a companion paper (Pittman, forthcoming), I discuss legislative proposals to increase the 
protections offered to captive shippers by removing the partial antitrust exemption currently 
enjoyed by U.S. freight railways. 
2 Major Issues in Rail Rate Cases, STB Ex Parte No. 657 (Sub-No. 1), October 30, 2006, at 5-6, 
emphasis added, citations omitted. 
3 1 I.C.C. 2d 520 (1985). 
4 Major Issues in Rail Cases, at 6-7. 2 
 
current and future service needs.”  The management efficiency constraint protects 
captive shippers from paying for avoidable inefficiencies … that are shown to 
increase a railroad’s revenue need to a point where the shipper’s rate is affected.  
The stand-alone cost (SAC) constraint protects a captive shipper from bearing 
costs of inefficiencies or from cross-subsidizing other traffic by paying more than 






The Stand-Alone-Cost test posits a hypothetical railroad that serves a subset of the 
movements in the railroad’s network, including the route used by the complaining 
shipper.  That hypothetical railroad is called a Stand-Alone Railroad, known as a 
SARR, and it is designed to be optimally efficient.  The Stand-Alone-Cost test 
determines the rate that the shippers using the SARR … would be charged by 
taking into account the costs of running the SARR, including a reasonable return 
on investment….  The amount of those costs becomes the maximum amount that 
the railroad may collect from the traffic group.
6 
 
  Unfortunately, in the decades following the ICC’s issuance of the Guidelines, the 
stand-alone-cost (SAC) test has become what a reviewing court feared it would be:  “a 
full employment bill for economists”.
7  The STB has estimated that “shippers’ litigation 
costs in recent Full-SAC cases have approached $5 million” and cited with approval an 
estimate that “even a Simplified-SAC presentation would likely cost up to $1 million to 
litigate.”
8  These estimates do not include the corresponding costs incurred by the 
defendant railroads and the STB.   The reason for this is straightforward:  given the huge 
amounts of money at issue, both sides in a rate case have the incentive to add increasing 
layers of complexity to the inherently uncertain exercise of simulating the costs of a 
SARR – so long, of course, as each layer added either adds to or subtracts from the costs, 
as desired – and thus to dissipate rents. 
 
  It is worth quoting at length from an STB decision that describes the degree of 
detail involved in this exercise (and note that the STB is simply stating the facts here, not 
arguing that the degree of detail is excessive). 
 
To make a SAC presentation, a shipper designs a hypothetical new carrier (a 
stand-alone railroad, or SARR) that is specifically tailored to serve an optimum 
traffic group with the optimum physical plant (rail system) needed for that traffic.  
Projected traffic volumes, operating speeds, and traffic densities must be 
calculated to determine the requirements for locomotives, cars, and train operating 
                                                 
5 Ibid. at 7, emphasis added. 
6 BNSF Railway v. STB, U.S.C.A. (D.C. Circuit) No. 06-1372, May 20, 2008. 
7 Consolidated Rail Corp. v. U.S., 812 F.2d 1444 (3d Cir. 1987), at 1463 (Becker, J., concurring 
in part). 
8 Simplified Standards for Rail Rate Cases, STB Ex Parte No. 646 (Sub-No. 1), September 4, 
2007, at 5.  See also Gaskins (2008). 3 
 
personnel.  A detailed operating plan must be developed to further define the 
physical plant that would be needed for the SARR.  For example, roadway must 
be sufficient to permit the attainment of the speeds and density that are presumed.  
The length and frequency of passing sidings must be able to accommodate the 
specific train lengths and frequency of train meets that are assumed, and traffic 
control devices must be designed to allow trains traveling in opposite directions 
on the same track to be handled safely and efficiently based on the density and 
congestion assumed in the operating plan.
9 
 
At this point, 
 
These plans are used to compute the total investment and operating costs that 
would be incurred by the SARR and would need to be recovered by it.  To be 
fully viable, a SARR would have to generate sufficient revenues to cover its 
investment costs, the cost of funds tied up during the construction period, 
operating expenses, tax liabilities, and a reasonable return on investment.
10 
 
In the case whose STB decision was just quoted, the shipper posited a SARR of 1400 
route miles, traversing five states, connecting coal mines in the Powder River Basin of 
Wyoming with eleven coal-fired power plants in four states.  The SARR was even given 
a name:  the West Texas Railroad.  Not to be outdone, another shipper created a 3000-
mile SARR, dubbed the Overland Railroad, extending “from Portland, OR to Chicago, IL 
and Kansas City, MO, with a 375-mile extension into the Powder River Basin (PRB) coal 
fields.”
11  In that case the STB decision Appendix describing the SARR configuration, 
operating plan, and revenue analysis runs to almost 100 pages. 
 
  Evidence with this degree of complexity inevitably invites further regulatory 
dispute and litigation over a seemingly endless list of details regarding the configuration, 
costs, and revenues of the hypothetical SARR.  Among the issues litigated have been the 
following: 
 
  Whether a one-year, ten-year, or twenty-year SAC analysis is most appropriate;
12 
  Since the SAC analysis may include twenty years of future SARR operations, 
whether expected average productivity improvements in freight railroads 
generally should be applied without adjustment to the SARR, or whether, since 
the SARR would be ex hypothesi newly built and so at the frontier of 
productivity, whether such industry-wide improvements should be factored in 
only gradually (and if gradually, how gradually);
13 
                                                 
9 West Texas Utilities Company v. BN Railroad, 1 S.T.B. 638 (1996), at 13-14 (parentheses in 
original). 
10 Ibid. at 14 (footnotes omitted). 
11 FMC Wyoming Corporation and FMC Corporation v. Union Pacific Railroad, STB Ex Parte 
No. 346 (Sub-No. 29A), May 10, 2000. 
12 Major Issues in Rail Cases, at 61-66. 
13 BNSF Railway v. STB (2008). 4 
 
  Whether “a shipper hypothesizing costs in a joint rate case may … rely on the 
trackage rights that one defendant railroad … holds over track belonging to a 
second defendant railroad;”
14 
  How to allocate the hypothetical rates paid by hypothetical traffic that travels 
partly over the SARR and partly over existing lines of the defendant railroad 
between the two parts of the routing;
15 
  Whether train “dwell times” at points of traffic interchange should be assumed to 
be 30 minutes, 45 minutes, 60 minutes, or 90 minutes;
16 and 
  When new information becomes available – as it does inevitably for a ten- or 
twenty-year (hypothetical) forecast – “whether we [the STB] can continue to 
examine the reasonableness of the challenged rate within the framework of the 
prior SAC analysis (i.e., in a reopened proceeding), or whether we should instead 
vacate the rate prescription and dismiss this proceeding so that a new and 
different SAC analysis can be presented in a new proceeding.”
17  The decision 
quoted was written in 2007 and concerned an STB ruling made in 1996. 
 
It goes without saying that a process such as this one is plagued with both 
problems of asymmetric information and the resulting incentives and ability to pick and 
choose among such information in order to further one’s own agenda.  As Heald (1996) 
points out: 
 
In cases where there are no incontrovertible technical answers, participants in the 
policy process (dominant incumbents, potential entrants, consumers, regulators 
and governments) may have strong economic incentives to support particular 
technical solutions to the cost allocation problem, for reasons which are 
demonstrably congruent to their economic interest. 
 
  In 1996, Congress directed the STB to “establish a simplified and expedited 
method for determining the reasonableness of challenged rail rates in those cases in 
which a full stand-alone cost presentation is too costly, given the value of the case.”
18  
When no cases were brought under the “simplified guidelines” issued by the STB in 
response, the STB in 2006 created “a simplified stand-alone cost (Simplified-SAC) 
procedure to use in medium-size rate disputes for which a full stand-alone cost (Full-
SAC) presentation is too costly, given the value of the case” and refined “the ‘Three-
                                                 
14 Arizona Electric Power Cooperative v. STB, U.S.C.A. (D.C. Circuit), No. 05-1136, July 18, 
2006, at 2; see also Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. vs. Consolidated Rail Corp, Decision, ICC 
Docket No. 38186S, July 24, 1984. 
15 Ibid. at 24-39. 
16 Western Fuels Association and Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. BNSF Railway, Decision, 
STB Docket No. 42088, February 17, 2009, at 17-18. 
17 West Texas Utilities Company v. BNSF Railway Company, STB Decision, Docket No. 41191, 
September 2007, at 7. 
18 49 U.S.C. 10701(d)(3). 5 
 
Benchmark’ method of [the] Simplified Guidelines … for small rate disputes for which 
even a Simplified-SAC presentation would be too costly, given the value of the case.”
19 
 
  Such refinements, however, seem only to highlight the importance of a set of 
more fundamental questions.  When does a stand-alone cost presentation become “too 
costly” – not “given the value of the case” but given its contribution to an efficient and/or 
equitable outcome to a rate dispute?  Where did the stand-alone-cost test come from, and 
to what degree do its analytical origins and foundations justify the importance granted it 
by the STB – not to mention the resulting expenditures of real resources on its use by 
shippers, carriers, and the STB – in large rate disputes?  How much justification is there 
for the STB’s stated view that “the SAC test, which judges the reasonableness of a 
challenged rate by comparison to the rate that would prevail in a competitive market, 
rests on a sound economic foundation….”?
20  As we will see, the answers to these 




Where did the stand-alone-cost test come from?  The ICC decision that introduced CMP, 
Coal Rate Guidelines, Nationwide, places its origins squarely within the concept of 
contestable markets: 
 
Two economic theories are central [to] Constrained Market Pricing – differential 
pricing and the contestability of markets.  They provide the analytical basis for 
determining those costs for which a shipper may properly be charged and the 
extent to which the shipper should bear the costs….  Our use of SAC introduces 
the competitive standard of contestability into a non-competitive market.  The 
stand-alone cost, as we define it here, approximates the full economic costs, 
including a normal profit, that need to be met for an efficient producer to provide 
service to the shipper(s) identified.
21 
 




In turn, the locus classicus for market contestability, Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 
(1982, hereinafter BPW), credits the concepts of stand-alone cost and the stand-alone-
cost test to the classic paper by Faulhaber (1975).
23  So it is to that paper that we turn 
first. 
                                                 
19 Simplified Standards for Rail Rate Cases, STB Ex Parte No. 646 (Sub-No. 1), September 4, 
2007, at 4. 
20 Ibid. at 13. 
21 Coal Rate Guidelines, Nationwide, at 5, 9. 
22 PPL Montana v. STB, U.S.C.A. (D.C. Circuit) No. 04-1369, February 17, 2006, at 9. 
23 See also Sidak (2007):  “The stand-alone cost test and the related incremental cost test are two 
standard methods in the economics of regulation for detecting the presence of cross-subsidy.  
Gerald Faulhaber formally proposed both tests as a part of an economic framework developed for 
cross-subsidization analysis in a classic 1975 article.”  (p. 35; emphasis and footnotes removed) 6 
 
 
  Faulhaber addresses “the problem of pricing commodities produced in the 
presence of common costs by a publicly owned or regulated enterprise.”  He notes that  
 
the economics literature has by and large focused on the efficiency of such 
commodity prices [he is referring here mainly to the literature on Ramsey 
pricing]whereas public policy makers are also concerned about more loosely 
defined questions of equity:  does a proposed price structure for the 
multicommodity enterprise “unduly” favor the consumers of one commodity at 
the expense of the purchasers of another commodity, i.e., does the price structure 
result in cross-subsidy? (p. 966; emphasis added) 
 
Faulhaber proceeds to argue that 
 
As a first approximation, we may use this intuitively appealing notion as the basis 
for a definition:  If the provision of any commodity (or group of commodities) by 
a multicommodity enterprise subject to a profit constraint leads to prices for the 
other commodities no higher than they would pay by themselves, then the price 
structure is subsidy-free.  (p. 966; emphasis in original) 
 
This “intuitively appealing notion” might seem to suggest a “fairness” argument, 
but Faulhaber quickly backs away from this line of thinking.  First he notes that “we [are 
not] entitled to assume that such [subsidy-free] price structures are morally superior to 
their subsidy-prone fellows on grounds of social justice” (p. 967); then in a footnote he 
explicitly and forcefully contrasts his own analysis reported in this paper with that of 
other papers that recommend a certain method of setting prices in public enterprises “on 
the basis of its purported ‘fairness’ and ‘equity’.”
24 
 
In fact Faulhaber’s reasoning is based unambiguously on what BPW will term 
“sustainability”.  His game-theoretic analysis asks the question:  what is the highest price 
that a profit-constrained, multiproduct monopolist may charge a particular group of 
customers without giving that group the incentive to break away and engage in self-
supply?  This priceis the stand-alone cost, the cost that such a group would have to pay to 
supply itself only: 
 
In this paper, the emphasis is not on finding a unique set of prices which is “fair”, 
but rather on determining a set of prices, all of which are subsidy-free, and … 
provide the appropriate incentives for consumer groups to seek the most efficient 
means of supply in the presence of joint production. (p. 970, fn. 13) 
 
If any prices are set above this level – above stand-alone cost – some group of customers 
will have the incentive to “go it alone,” even though “the single supplier is the uniquely 
                                                 
24 Thus Borrmann and Zauner (2004) seem to be simply incorrect when they argue that “There is 
a fundamental ambiguity in Faulhaber’s (1975) concept.  Is cross-subsidy about fairness or about 
market entry?” (p. 246, fn. 1) 7 
 
most efficient production arrangement” (p. 968).  Indeed, if the regulator insists upon 
setting prices above the stand-alone cost level,  
 
Then the coercive authority of the government must be employed to restrict or 
prohibit entry into the market.  Thus, even when the public enterprise enjoys 
increasing returns to scale, if the regulators adopt a pricing policy of subsidization 
as we have defined, entry must be restricted.  (p. 972) 
 
  Again, Faulhaber emphasizes that “prices which are subsidy-free do not 
necessarily promote the common weal or bring about social justice.”  Furthermore,  
 
there is no a priori reason to expect that prices which maximize welfare subject to 
a break-even constraint [i.e., Ramsey prices] will necessarily be subsidy-free….  
Since quasi-optimal prices depend on marginal costs and demand elasticities, 
whereas the constraints defining subsidy-free prices depend on the costs of 
alternative means of supply, it is no surprise that the two ideas are not necessarily 
compatible.  (p. 973) 
 
Thus Faulhaber.  When BPW take up Faulhaber’s concept of stand-alone cost, it 
is once again with an emphasis on the prevention of inefficient entry: 
 
Prices cannot be sustainable if they involve any cross subsidy….  Quite simply, if 
the revenues collected from the sale of a subset of products … exceed the cost of 
providing the same quantity of those products independently, a profitable entry 
opportunity is offered to anyone willing to supply the same bundle at a slightly 
lower price and, in a perfectly contestable market, entry will occur….   
Equilibrium in perfectly contestable markets requires that the revenues earned on 
any part of the total output of the industry be no more than the stand-alone 
production cost of that part.  (pp. 351-52 and 354) 
 
A near-simultaneous verified statement by Baumol and Willig also cites the classic 
treatise by Kahn in support of this test, and Kahn is specifically discussing “cream 
skimming” – the question of whether prices higher than stand-alone costs (he does not 
use this term yet) might attract inefficient entry and so threaten sustainability.
25 
 
Besides emphasizing sustainability, however, BPW are arguably a bit more 
willing than Faulhaber to venture into normative grounds: 
 
Condition (12D1) has been referred to by Faulhaber … and others as the stand-
alone cost test, and failure to pass it indicates that the set of services … is in a 
significant sense subsidizing the remaining set of the firm’s products.  This is true 
because, at current prices, the users of these services will then be paying more 
than it would cost a separate firm to provide only those products at their current 
levels.  (p. 352; emphasis added; original emphasis removed) 
 
                                                 




When the monopoly market is not perfectly contestable, regulation may be 
desirable; but regulatory policy should then be designed, insofar as possible, to 
replicate the results of a contestable market.  (p. 355; emphasis added) 
 
Thus BPW.  According to Faulhaber and BPW, the stand-alone-cost test is 
motivated and justified mostly by concerns for the sustainability of the natural monopoly 
in the face of potential inefficient entry.  In addition, it may suggest that certain Ramsey 
prices are cross-subsidizing other prices and are thus in some sense unfair.  Not 
surprisingly, there is not much foundation laid for the fairness argument, and Heald’s 
(1996) evaluation seems on the mark in this respect: 
 
The academic literature on cost allocation is overwhelmingly normative in design 
and prescriptive in its conclusions.  How to allocate common costs is an 
intellectually fascinating problem, in answer to which it is possible to engage in 
sophisticated modeling and mathematical analysis.  Perhaps the fundamental 
question to be asked about these solution algorithms relates to why decision-
makers should find compelling the particular value judgments which underpin 
particular solutions.  The algorithms, however elegant, often have little in terms of 




  Let us review the bidding up to this point.  According to the scholarly works upon 
which the STB has based its rulings, the application of a stand-alone-cost test to rates 
charged to customers of a monopolist constrained to earn zero economic profits insures 
that, in a contestable market, costly and inefficient entry does not take place.  In addition, 
at least one of these works seems to entertain the idea that the stand-alone-cost test 
guards against such a monopolist unfairly forcing one group of customers to cross-
subsidize another group of customers. 
 
  This would suggest the relevance of a few questions regarding the choice by the 
STB to use stand-alone-cost tests to evaluate rates charged to “captive” freight rail 
shippers. 
 
  First, are freight railroad companies in the U.S. constrained to earn zero economic 
profits?
26  No, they are not:  the “revenue adequacy constraint” referred to above means 
that once firm-wide economic profits exceed the estimated cost of capital, the STB may 
regulate the rates charged to captive shippers, but that fact is (obviously) not the same as 
a regulatory constraint on company profits.  In fact, a large-scale study recently 
                                                 
26 The principal reason for the importance of this question is the showing by both Faulhaber and 
BPW that in the presence of a zero profit constraint and under the assumption of efficient 
operations, if one group of shippers is paying more than SAC, it necessarily follows that some 
other group is paying less than its incremental cost – i.e., is being subsidized.  See, e.g., Faulhaber 
(1975), BPW, Lenard, et al. (1992), and Meitzen and Larson (1992). 9 
 
commissioned by the STB concludes that the U.S. Class I railroads are now near or at the 
point of earning economic profits (Christensen Associates, 2008).  And yet, in a recent 
paper that evaluates the experience of regulatory application of the concepts in Faulhaber 
(1975), Faulhaber (2005) notes that 
 
In non-regulated enterprises, the norm would be that total revenues would at least 
equal and possibly exceed total economic cost….  The focus of cross-subsidy 
analysis shifts entirely to the IC [incremental cost] tests.  The SAC tests are not 
helpful under conditions of positive economic profits.  (emphasis added) 
 
  Second, is the railroad industry contestable?  Of course not:  a necessary (but not 
sufficient) requirement for contestability of an industry is that “entry is absolutely free 
and exit absolutely costless,”
27 and the Coal Rate Guidelines, Nationwide, freely concede 
that “the railroad industry is recognized to have barriers to entry and exit and thus is not 
considered contestable for captive traffic.”
28  (The last three words seem unnecessary.)  
The STB statement that its “use of SAC introduces the competitive standard of 
contestability into a non-competitive market”
29 has a reasonable sound but does not really 
explain why such an exercise is in any sense welfare- or efficiency-enhancing. 
 
  One possible path out of this particular conundrum might be the insight of Tirole 
(1988) that “the theory of contestable markets can … be seen as a generalization of 
Bertrand competition to markets with increasing returns to scale.”  There is some limited 
support in the empirical literature for Bertrand competition as the duopoly outcome of 
railroads shipping coal from the Powder River Basin (Winston, et al., 2007).  As Grimm 
(2008) points out, language in the most recent STB merger decisions suggests a possible 
adoption of this view:  “We now believe that rail carriers can and do compete effectively 
with each other in two-carrier markets.”
30  However, this is certainly not the standard 
finding or assumption, and the STB has not relied on this interpretation of contestability 
in its SAC discussions. 
 
  A second possible path is proposed by Fanara and Grimm (1985), who 
acknowledge the potentially large gap between rates that might attract actual stand-alone 
entry and the lower rates that are implied by the hypothetical SARR constructed under a 
CMP analysis.  The former rates, they suggest, would correspond to concerns regarding 
actual sustainability but would be extremely high, while the latter would thus correspond 
more closely to concerns regarding fairness. 
 
  But this suggests a third question:  in the freight railroad sector, is stand-alone-
cost analysis an important tool for regulators actually seeking to prevent inefficient entry?  
This seems quite unlikely:  new entry into the freight railroad business in the U.S. has 
been extremely rare; until fairly recently, the industry has been in a long period of 
                                                 
27 Coal Rate Guidelines, Nationwide, at 8, quoting testimony by Baumol. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. at 9. 
30 Union Pacific – Control and Merger – Southern Pacific, STB Finance Docket No. 32760, 
Decision No. 44, August 6, 1996, at 116-17. 10 
 
shedding excess capacity.  Furthermore, it is entirely in the interest of the incumbent 
railroad to price in such a way that entry into its territory does not appear attractive.  In 
addition, the STB has the authority to deny applications for new line construction if the 
presence of the new capacity would “unduly harm existing services.”
31 
 
The single major project for new railroad construction advanced in recent years 
has been for the construction by the Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad (DM&E) of a 
new line into the Powder River Basin, the coal producing area served by the carriers in 
some of the rate cases cited here.  In the lengthy STB proceedings that authorized 
construction (which has not yet taken place, and may not),
32 the principal participating 
shippers’ group, the Western Coal Traffic League, argued that “access to the PRB by an 
additional … rail carrier would assist in mitigating UP’s and BNSF’s [the current serving 
carriers] capacity shortcomings, and thereby improve rail service reliability.”
33 
 
The STB decision alludes briefly to the possibility (and relevance) of harm to 
existing carriers as an instance or cause of harm to existing services, but the decision 
does not so much as mention any evidence that the UP and/or BNSF would be 
significantly harmed by DM&E entry into the PRB – evidence that would seem to be at 
least related to the sustainability question – rather focusing entirely on the seemingly odd 
issue of whether the magnitude of the proposed investment project and the possibility of 
its failure might constitute threats to existing service by the DM&E to its existing, non-
PRB customers.
34  Remarkably, then, in the single major SAC case in which the 
sustainability issue is at least in principle relevant, the STB decision avoids the issue 
almost entirely. 
 
Seen from this perspective, the STB statements justifying the use of the SAC test 
seem more to avoid than to address the questions of economic efficiency and total 
welfare: 
 
In sum, our use of SAC introduces the competitive standard of contestability into 
a non-competitive market.  The stand-alone cost, as we define it here, 
approximates the full economic costs, including a normal profit, that need to be 
met for an efficient producer to provide service to the shippers identified.  This 
                                                 
31  Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad Construction into the Powder River Basin, STB 
Finance Docket No. 33407 (3 S.T.B. 847; 1998 STB LEXIS 968) (December 10, 1998), citing 49 
U.S.C. 10901(c) and Tongue River R.R. - Rail Construction & Operation - Ashland to Decker, 
MT, STB Finance Docket No. 30186 (Sub-No. 2) (Nov. 8, 1996). 
32 See U.S. Federal Railroad Administration, “FRA Administrator Denies DM&E Powder River 
Basin Loan Application Citing Unacceptable Risk to Federal Taxpayers,” February 26, 2007. 
33  Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad Corporation Construction into the Powder River 
Basin, 3 S.T.B. 847 (1998), at 7. 
34  Ibid.; see also the subsequent STB decision granting approval for construction following 
investigation of possibly averse environmental impacts, Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad 
Corporation Construction into the Powder River Basin, 2002 STB LEXIS 74, and the decision 
granting final approval for construction following court appeal and remand, Dakota, Minnesota & 
Eastern Railroad Corporation Construction into the Powder River Basin, Decision, STB Finance 
Docket No. 33407, February 15, 2006. 11 
 
cost calculation produces a simulated competitive price standard against which 
actual rates can be compared.
35 
 
A SAC analysis seeks to determine whether a complainant is bearing costs 
resulting from inefficiencies or costs associated with facilities or services from 
which it derives no benefit; it does this by simulating the competitive rate that 
would exist in a “contestable market.”…  A SARR is … hypothesized that could 
serve the traffic at issue if the rail industry were free of entry barriers….  This 




We would seem to be left only with arguments for the stand-alone-cost test 
related to fairness.  As I discuss in the companion paper to this one (Pittman, 
forthcoming), fairness is a perfectly relevant topic for discussion regarding rates charged 
to captive shippers; in a sector with a high level of fixed and sunk costs, there is no 
single, optimal way to set rates for full cost recovery.
37  Particularly once the railways are 
earning their cost of capital – as they are now, arguably – any increase in rates to the 
railroads (part of which goes to stockholders, but part of which goes to labor, and part to 
maintaining and improving capacity, including new and expensive statutory requirements 
for the installation of Positive Train Control equipment) comes at the expense of coal 
mine owners and labor and investment, electric utilities, and electricity rate payers (and 
customers of commercial rate payers). 
 
What is the right mix of charges to those diverse groups?  Rates set at “what the 
market will bear” economize on judicial and regulatory costs and fund railroad 
investment.  Rates constrained to be below that level leave more resources in the hands of 
the coal and electricity industries and electricity customers.  Ramsey prices achieve 
revenue adequacy at a minimum cost to total welfare, but customers with the fewest 
economic alternatives may pay very high – even “unfair”, even “cross subsidizing” – 
rates.  Even Ramsey prices constrained by SAC analysis leave shippers – by definition – 
with zero share of the economies of scope of the overall railway enterprise.  We have not 
even touched on the question of environmental externalities:  whether, as complainants 
argued in the DM&E matter before the STB, lower rates for shipping coal may be a bad 
thing if they encourage the construction of more coal-fired power plants and the 
consumption of more electricity.
38  Large sums of money are at stake here, and political 
resolutions may be inevitable. 
 
                                                 
35 Coal Rate Guidelines, Nationwide, at 9. 
36 Major Issues in Rail Rate Cases, at 7.  See also Freeman (1984), who asks why, “where 
competition does not exist, it is [reasonable] to define maximum rate levels on the basis that 
nonexistent competition will keep them reasonable.” 
37 See also the more basic microeconomic presentation in Pittman (2004). 
38 See especially Mid States Coalition for Progress vs. STB, 345 F.3d 520 (8
th Cir. 2003) and 
Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad Corporation Construction into the Powder River Basin, 
Decision, STB Finance Docket No. 33407, February 15, 2006. 12 
 
What seems clear, however, is that a focus on the best level of the rates 
themselves is much to be preferred to a lengthy and expensive examination of various 
cost issues that – as I have argued in this paper – are not obviously relevant to the 
desirability of the rates themselves.  Whatever is the fairest or best or most equitable way 
to divide the available quasi-rents among various claimants, it would seem to have 
extremely little to do with the choices of rules for introducing expected productivity 
improvements or for cost sharing on two sections of track on a hypothetical railroad over 
a twenty year period in the future – or with any of the other myriad of complex and 
expensive details that constitute the stand-alone-cost test as it is implemented in the 
context of U.S. freight rail regulation.  Meitzen and Larson (1992) generalize this point: 
 
The real issue in question is often the pricing of services, not their costs.  In other 
words, it is believed that the prices of particular services should be above or 
below some level, or that they should be higher or lower.  These beliefs are often 
supported by allocating shared costs in some manner (including … SAC) which 
“proves” the prices in question are the correct ones….  In such instances, it would 
be more fruitful to phrase the debate directly in terms of prices and not 
camouflage the real issue with debates over arbitrary “costs.” 
 
Surely a simpler, more straightforward, and above all cheaper way could be 
chosen to protect “captive” shippers.  As I suggest in the companion paper to this one 
(Pittman, forthcoming), one possibility would be a ceiling on the price-to-variable-cost 
ratio – corresponding to the floor on this ratio below which the STB lacks jurisdiction to 
challenge rates – that would, like the stand-alone-cost test, act as a constraint on the 
degree to which Ramsey pricing is permitted.  In fact the STB imposed exactly such a 
rate ceiling as a remedy in a recent matter where the shipper was able to demonstrate that 
the rates it had been paying had been greater than SAC.
39  Alternatively, the literature on 
incentive regulation (Laffont and Tirole, 2000; Joskow, 2005) might be a fruitful source 
of ideas.   
 
 
                                                 
39 Western Fuels Association and Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. BNSF Railway (2009), 
supra note 16.  See also the similar ceiling imposed in West Texas Utilities Company v. BN 
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